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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this Court is pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. §78-2-2(j) 
(1953), as amended. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
ISSUE: Did the Lower Court Err by Failing to Realize That There Were 
Disputed Issues of Material Facts That Should Have Precluded the 
Lower Court from Granting a Motion for Summary Judgment. 
Standard of Review: "Summary judgment is appropriate only when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 
The Court must view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving 
party, but it may not assume facts for which no evidence is offered. We review a trial court's 
order granting summary judgment for correctness." Mountain West Surgical Center v. 
Hospital Corp. of Utah, 2007 UT 92, TflO. Under a correctness review the lower court is 
afforded no deference. Afridi v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 2005 UT 53, TJ5, 122 P.3d 
596. Review of fraudulent intent fell under the correctness standard of the summary 
judgment review. Lakeside Lumber Products, Inc. v. Evans, 2005 UT App 87, ^|8, P.3d 154. 
This issue was preserved in the lower court. R. 500-503. 
There were further issues that could also be raised1 but the granting of summary 
1
 Another issue was whether the evidence was sufficient to prove by clear 
and convincing evidence that all of the elements of fraud were met. 
Standard of Review: Whether there was sufficient evidence to support a 
finding is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Pasker, Gould, Ames & Weaver 
v. Morse, 887 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). "To demonstrate that the trial court's 
findings of fact are clearly erroneous the appellant must first marshal all the evidence in 
1 
judgment when there are disputed issues of facts is so fundamentally inappropriate that that 
issue should be sufficient alone to warrant reversal of the lower courts granting of the 
summary judgment. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS AND STATUTES 
DETERMINATIVE OF THE APPEAL 
None. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
(Introduction) 
This is an appeal from a decision of the Third District Court, Honorable Robert P. 
Faust presiding, granting Kurt Summary Judgment in this matter. The lower court ruled on 
motion that Cindy had defrauded Kurt. In particular, the lower court concluded on motion 
that Kurt relied on a false statement made by Cindy and had entered into a settlement where 
he was to pay child support in excess of the statutory guidelines. However, since there was 
evidence that the child support was to compensate for Kurt's potentially lopsided property 
allocation the Decree of Divorce was set aside to determine the amount of child support that 
should be paid and the property distribution. No damages were awarded inasmuch as the 
lower court in the Divorce Action could determine those damages, if any, and offset them 
against the property award, if necessary and available. A copy of the lower court's 
Memorandum Decision is attached hereto as Addendum "A." 
After a fifteen year marriage Cindy and Kurt, while both were represented by legal 
counsel, divorced in May 2004. In an independent action filed in 2005Kurt claimed that 
support of those findings. Id. The issue was preserved for appeal in the lower court. R. 
503-521. 
2 
Cindy had made a statement in December 2003 about her health that defrauded Kurt to enter 
a Settlement Agreement in late April 2004 and the entry of the Decree in May 2004. The 
Settlement Agreement and the Decree provided for child support that was greater than what 
was provided by the standard guidelines for child support and was unmodifiable except for 
health concerns of Kurt. The fact that the amount was greater than the guidelines was 
specifically set forth in the Settlement Agreement and Decree. Kurt brought the action to set 
aside the child support provision and to leave the remaining portions of the Decree of 
Divorce in force. Kurt and Cindy had agreed to the child support amount that would assure 
Cindy of an amount of money to provide to Cindy a property settlement since Kurt obtained 
a lopsided allocation of the marital estate. 
Kurt's claim was made under a fraud theory. However, there are genuine issues of 
material facts that should have precluded the lower court from granting a Motion for 
Summary Judgment and entering a judgment in favor of Kurt. The facts, taken in a light 
most favorable to Cindy, show that Kurt should not have been granted Summary Judgment 
as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are taken in a light most favorable to Cindy and are supported by 
the record. These facts demonstrate that the trier of facts on trial could determine that Kurt 
had not been defrauded by Cindy. 
1. Kurt and Cindy were married on April 29, 1989. R. 560, | 2 . 
2. Kurt filed for divorce (a second filing during the marriage) on July 3,2003 in 
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the matter entitled: 
William Kurt Dobson v. Cindy Delaughter Cooper 
Civil No. 050922651 
Third District Court 
State of Utah 
R. 561,ffl4-5. 
3. Kurt was represented by competent and experienced legal counsel. R. 429,13. 
4. The divorce proceedings were particularly contested, mean-spirited, 
excessively volatile and marked by distrust. The divorce action was hotly contested on all 
issues throughout the litigation. R. 560-61,1(3. Cindy was very suspicious of Kurt and Kurt 
of her. The parties' distrust of one another went not only to financial issues but also their 
personal lives and their relationships with their children. R. 433,1115 -16. The contested 
issues included property allocation, child support, alimony\spousal support, debt allocation 
and other issues incident to divorcing spouses and parents. Almost everything required 
litigation. R. 429,15. 
5. Cindy demanded $4,500.00\month in child support, premised upon Cindy not 
going to work outside the home and being a stay-at-home mother (as Cindy and Kurt had 
previously discussed when they were together) and to compensate for an unequal division 
of assets. Kurt wanted to keep very valuable assets, including expensive cars (including a 
race car) and businesses (Kurt told Cindy that he did not want her to know what was going 
on in those businesses). The amount to be paid was designated as child support instead of 
alimony so that Cindy would be entitled to receive the amount even if Cindy remarried and 
would be a counterbalance for the property distribution. R. 563-64,17; R. 565,19; R. 565, 
4 
110; R. 584-85,148.. See also R. 561-63, \6. A copy of the Decree of Divorce is attached 
hereto as Addendum "B." 
6. Kurt made it very difficult for Cindy to find out any information about the 
assets and had kept all the finances secret from Cindy. Kurt told Cindy on multiple 
occasions: 
"You will never find where I put the money" 
"You would never have access to any of the businesses." 
"I have money in other peoples5 names. You'll never find it." 
"I've hidden it in places where you will never find it." 
"I'll have you in a trailer park if you don't do what I say." 
Cindy wanted to end the divorce process and just have enough to care for the children. R. 
564-65,18. 
7. The property distribution and value of the property at the time of the divorce 
was as follows: 
To Kurt: $757,250.00 (plus unknown values for business assets, retirement 
accounts and bank accounts) 
To Cindy: $148,000.00 
Some assets were allocated equally between Kurt and Cindy that were not valued at the time 
that are in addition to the amounts above. A more detailed description of the division of 
assets is set forth in Addendum "E" attached hereto. R. 565-68, ^ [11. 
8. Kurt was anxious to have the Decree entered because he had a an anticipated 
large windfall coming that Cindy did not know about. In an affidavit Kurt made in the 
5 
Divorce Action (first time Cindy learned of it) Kurt stated: 
When the divorce was resolved I had an income history of 
approximately $200,000.00 a year base and I was the founder of 
a company that I thought was one or two months away from a 
significant multi-million dollar venture capital investment. My 
salary was scheduled to increase along with a schedule of 
bonuses. However, shortly after the divorce was settled the 
company (S5 Wireless) lost the venture capital investor and my 
salary became unstable and by October I left the company to 
obtain a position where I could be paid in a more stable manner. 
R. 544, T|6. Kurt never told Cindy about this "multi-million dollar" development. That may 
have explained why Kurt was so anxious to have the decree entered. R. 568, ^ 12. 
9. In the midst of the divorce proceedings Cindy began experiencing some health 
concerns. Cindy's initial medical concerns evidenced themselves in June 2003 but most 
evidence of illness was after having cosmetic surgery where a suspicious mole was found. 
As things progressed Cindy experienced the following: 
• Pain through Cindy's back area (June 2003 through the present); 
currently Cindy has a spot near Cindy's kidney that constantly remains 
in pain 
• Nausea and Vomiting (began in September 2003 and continued, 
getting worse, through December and then declined through March 
2004) 
• Urinating blood (starting August 2003 and intermittently in 
November 2003, February 2004 and occasionally afterwards) 
• Hair falling out (starting in August 2003 through December 2003) 
• Abnormal Menstrual Cycles ; excessive bleeding for weeks or no 
menstrual period at all (excessive bleeding starting August 2003 
through December2003\January 2004 then menstrual stopped. 
• Excessive weight loss; Cindy lost 50 pounds including the maximum 
6 
of 10 pounds lost from the liposuction (beginning August 2003 through 
January 2004) 
• Anxiety and Depression; Cindy could not sleep, was lethargic and 
weak; could not keep food down; had dark circles under Cindy's eyes 
(starting in August 2003 through December 2003; with intermittent 
episodes afterwards) 
R. 322;325;331;569,113. 
10. Cindy initially went to Dr. John Clayton, a cosmetic surgeon to have some 
cosmetic surgery (liposuction). Kurt had just left Cindy for a twenty-six year old woman that 
he had met on the Millionaires.com. This new woman was living in New York and was 
looking for a husband so she could stay in the United States. Kurt began to treat Cindy and 
the children like they were a nuisance. Needless to say, this sent Cindy into an emotional 
tailspin. Hence, Cindy turned to liposuction. However, it was quite fortuitous that Cindy had 
the liposuction. R. 569-70, TJ14. 
11. Dr. Clayton performed the liposuction surgery in August 2003 and during the 
surgery a suspicious mole was discovered on Cindy's back. After the surgery (one week 
later) Dr. Clayton called Cindy into his office and expressed grave concern for Cindy. Dr. 
Clayton told Cindy that he took the liberty of taking a specimen of the mole and sent it to 
pathology. Dr. Clayton told Cindy that the mole was suspicious and that Cindy should have 
it checked by an oncologist (cancer specialist) immediately. Dr. Clayton told Cindy that if 
he had not detected the mole that Cindy would be dead within a year. Cindy believed at that 
time that she had cancer. That information really upset Cindy and Cindy was crying in Dr. 
Clayton's office. Cindy was already an emotional wreck from the divorce. Dr. Clayton's 
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office made the appointment with the oncologist for within a week of Cindy 5s meeting with 
Dr. Clayton. The fact that the appointment had been made so quickly and to an oncologist 
instead of a dermatologist further upset Cindy and caused Cindy to believe that the condition 
was really serious. Cindy knew an oncologist to be a cancer specialist. R. 322; 570, ^15. 
12. On the referral of Dr. Clayton, Cindy met in October 2003 with Rick D. Noyes, 
M.D., an oncologist, to continue the examination regrading the suspicious mole that was on 
Cindy's left mid back where the kidney is located (the same spot where Cindy had kidney 
pain). At that time Dr. Noyes examined Cindy fully for moles and told Cindy that she had 
what appeared to be a melanoma. Dr. Noyes told Cindy that the suspicious mole appeared 
to be serious but that Cindy was not to worry. Nonetheless, Cindy was crying and was upset. 
Cindy understood a melanoma to be a skin cancer that could be potentially dangerous. Cindy 
believed Dr. Noyes had a pathology report from Dr. Clayton at that meeting. According to 
Dr. Noyes' recommendation they scheduled another surgery for October 27,2003 to perform 
what Dr. Noyes told Cindy was a wide excision to remove the melanoma. That surgery was 
done and a portion of the skin where the mole was previously located was also removed. The 
incision left a scar that is approximately 8 inches long that Cindy has to this day. During this 
time there were Court hearings scheduled. Dr. Noyes wrote a note for Cindy to excuse Cindy 
from a court hearing. A copy of that note is attached as "Addendum "C." Dr. Noyes gave 
Cindy that note. The note, on Dr. Noyes stationary\prescription pad said, among other things: 
Special Instructions: 
[Hand Written] Maybe be (sic) extended due to recovery times. 
Pt. [patient] is to have surgery on the 27th of October. She will 
8 
be unable to attend court. Pi [patient] is having a wide excision 
of melanoma. 
(Emphasis added.) Cindy read the note and understood it to mean that she had melanoma 
since that is what Dr. Noyes said that it was. That note was used to excuse Cindy from the 
Court hearing. R. 323; 570-71,1J16, 430,1J8.. 
13. In early November 2003 Cindy went back to have the incision on Cindy's back 
for the melanoma excision treated because the incision had opened up unexpectedly and 
became infected. Those treatments were done in the emergency room and at home with IV 
antibiotics. R. 571-72,^17. 
14. Dr. Noyes told Cindy that she had melanoma. Cindy was devastated and 
worried and concerned about herself and the children. Cindy was particularly concerned 
because there was a family history of melanoma that had lead to a death. Also, Cindy had a 
family history of kidney problems. That family history added to Cindy's anxiety and fears. 
Cindy's emotional state at that time was a deep depression and Cindy had anxiety attacks. 
R. 323;572,T|18. 
15. Cindy went back to Dr. Noyes after the excision. Dr. Noyes told Cindy that 
he thought that he had gotten all the melanoma but that Cindy was to have checkups every 
three to six months to make sure the condition did not return. It frightened Cindy that this 
was so serious that she had to go back so frequently for checkups. At no time did Dr. Noyes 
say that Cindy had not had a melanoma. Cindy understood that she had melanoma and that 
she had additional precautions she had to take (the check ups) in the future to detect 
reoccurrence. R. 572, f l9 
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16. During the period when the mole was being treated Cindy was also 
experiencing severe pain in Cindy's mid-back region where the melanoma was to be 
removed. That pain frightened her because it was in the same area as the melanoma. Cindy 
went to a hospital emergency service. A physician there referred Cindy to a urologist (Dr. 
George W. Middleton) for examination. R. 572, [^20. 
17. Just prior to the excision to remove what was told to Cindy to be a melanoma, 
Cindy met with Dr. Middleton, an urologist, who ran several tests on Cindy. Dr. Middleton 
told Cindy that the tests revealed kidney problems including blockages in both kidneys. Dr. 
Middleton put Cindy on pain medication and informed her that she needed surgery. A few 
days later, on October 24, 2003, Cindy returned to Cottonwood Hospital where Dr. 
Middleton's performed a procedure to open the blockage. Just three days later Cindy had the 
"wide excision of melanoma" surgery performed by Dr. Noyes. Dr. Middleton informed 
Cindy that she needed additional kidney blockage surgery. Cindy had additional kidney 
procedures by Dr. Middleton on November 13, 2003 and March 22, 2004. Dr. Middleton 
also wrote Cindy a note for an excuse for Cindy not being in court, a copy of which is 
attached as "Addendum "D." R. 572-73,1J2l(lst). 
18. During this same time in another visit to the emergency room a doctor 
explained to Cindy that she was having symptoms that were likely related in some way to the 
melanoma. The doctor told Cindy that he was worried that there was still melanoma present 
10 
in her body. R. 573, Tf21(2nd). 
19. Cindy was really scared about her heath. While Cindy had been trained as a 
registered nurse Cindy had not practiced any nursing for a period of fifteen (15) years prior 
to this occurrence. Cindy was a registered nurse for a short time only in the years 1991 to 
1993 on a medical unit. Cindy had no exposure to melanoma except for her grandmother 
who died of it years previously and Cindy knew that it could be potentially very dangerous. 
From what was explained to Cindy by Dr. Noyes, Cindy also knew that if the melanoma had 
spread to other parts of the body that it could be even more dangerous and even deadly. 
However, Cindy is not a doctor and she does not make diagnoses of illness, and especially 
serious illness. However, because Cindy was having multiple health related concerns at the 
same time Cindy was extremely fearful that they were all related to melanoma and could 
evidence that the melanoma was a more serious type. Again, that caused Cindy a great deal 
of stress and anxiety. R. 573-74, | 22. On December 31, 2003Cindy hastily signed an 
affidavit that indicated that she had stage 3 melanoma and an operation on her thyroid, failing 
to catch the refernce to stage 3 and thyroid. R. 590, ^ j 66. 
20. Between the painful kidney blockages and the melanoma excision, Cindy was 
in very bad shape emotionally and was not able to focus much on the divorce at hand. Cindy 
did not handle stress very well and the stress of the divorce was overwhelming her. Cindy 
did not want the controversy and wanted the divorce to conclude. Cindy wanted her health 
11 
back. The treatments for the melanoma seemed successful but, as with any form of cancer, 
required follow up visits to assure Cindy's condition was improving and that the melanoma 
was not returning or spreading. R. 574, ^[23. 
21. For the period of September 2003 to mid- to late December 2003, Cindy was 
emotionally fragile. Cindy had become extremely ill. Cindy lost a lot of weight (more so 
than the cosmetic surgery), her hair began to fall out, she was yellow in appearance with dark 
black circles under her eyes, her menstrual cycles were irregular and Cindy had significant 
uncontrolled bleeding for longer than usual periods of time and she was in pain a substantial 
amount of time. Cindy went to the Emergency Room several times for pain. Cindy was 
essentially incapacitated during this time. She was confined to her bed most of the time. 
Cindy even had IV medications at her home. R. 694, ^[6 and 7. 
22. The divorce proceedings caused Cindy a great deal of stress between August 
2003 and May 2004. The increased stress seemed to complicate Cindy's ongoing kidney 
problems. During this time Cindy visited with doctors and specialists at various hospitals 
and clinics at least 38 times. R. 576, [^30. 
23. Kurt's sister, Tamara, however, after seeing Cindy, reported to Kurt that Cindy 
was "not overly concerned about her health, but rather her concern was with the impending 
divorce." Cindy's indifference to her medical condition should have signaled to Kurt that 
Cindy's condition was not too serious. R. 576, TJ29. 
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24. Kurt made little contact with the children in the fall of 2003 and showed no 
concern for Cindy's health. R. 694-95, ffi[8-9. 
25. Beginning in January 2004 Cindy' s health began to improve but Cindy was still 
having some health problems. They were: 
• Episodes with kidney pain • Episodes of Headaches (Migraine) 
• High blood pressure • Increased lipase levels 
R. 576, p i . 
26. Cindy did not see Kurt frequently from January 1,2004 through April 26, 2004 
when the Settlement Agreement for entry of the Decree of Divorce was signed. Kurt did not 
take the children often during this time and Cindy and Kurt had little interaction except for 
emails and an occasional visit with each other. However, Cindy and Kurt did meet and talk 
on at least the following occasions where the following conversations were held: 
• December 2003: Mediation sessions late December: No mention of 
Cindy's health ever came up. R. 577, TJ33, R. 577-78, 
H34.2 
• January 1, 2004: Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy was going to move to 
2
 On December 23, 2003 Kurt and Cindy had mediation scheduled. That was 
Cindy's birthday. Cindy arrived with her lawyer. Cindy and her lawyer waited for Kurt 
to arrive. After about an hour Kurt was called who said that he was in California for 
vacation with Zivile, his girlfriend. Later that day Cindy called Kurt and asked why he 
would schedule a mediation for that day and not show up. Kurt responded saying again 
that he was in California on vacation with Zivile. Kurt, with sarcasm, also said: "Did you 
have fun in mediation on your birthday? How much did it cost you?" R. 577-78, TJ34. 
13 
Dallas, Texas to live to be closer to Cindy's mother and 
father. 
January 8, 2004: Cindy told Kurt: "These children have suffered 
enough and I will be raising them on my own without 
you and it's hard and I will be doing this for the next 20 
years." R. 579-80, ffi[37 and 38. 
January 2004: Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy going to buy a home in 
Dallas. R. 578, ^ 36. 
January 21, 2004: Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy was going to raise the 
children. R. 579-80, V8. 
February 2004: 
January\ 
February 2004: 
February 2004: 
Kurt tod Cindy: "It looks like you replaced me pretty 
fast. You must not be too sick if you are jetting off to 
Dallas every other weekend." 
Cindy told Kurt: "I'm doing a lot better. I'm doing 
fine. 1 think that we have resolved most of the problems 
[referring to her health]." 
R. 580-81,|40. 
Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy was going to return to 
work. 
Kurt told Cindy: Cindy would beg Kurt to take the 
children after working 12 hour shifts and attempting to 
raise three kids on her own. R. 585—86, f 51. 
March 2004: 
March 2004: 
Cindy's lawyer made this statement in open court 
with Kurt and Kurt's lawyer present: After referring 
to the melanoma went on to state that "these treatments 
[the melanoma treatments] are successful. R. 581-82, 
1f42,R.436,^|28. 
Kurt told Cindy: "Gosh, I can't remember the last 
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time you went to a concert.5' "It looks like you are 
having a lot of fun." 
Cindy told Kurt: "I'm having a great time. Life goes 
on." "I'm feeling great. I haven't felt this good in 
months." 
Kurt told Cindy: "I'm glad you are feeling better." 
R. 582,1}43. 
• April 2004: Kurt told Cindy: You are "looking really good." "So 
I guess you are okay." 
Cindy told Kurt: "Yeah, I'm feeling better and I'm 
moving on with my life and moving to Texas." Cindy 
said that she was considering marrying David. 
Kurt told Cindy: You should marry someone "who 
was rich." 
R. 582-83, fM 
• May 2004: Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy was probably going to 
marry David. 
At no time did Cindy tell Kurt that Cindy was about to die or was going to die from any of 
the maladies that Cindy had. To the contrary, Cindy told Kurt that she was going to do what 
was necessary to care for herself and their children and make a life for them "for the next 
twenty years." If Kurt believed that Cindy was about to die he leapt to that conclusion 
without any help from Cindy. R. 576-77, THI32, 33. 
27. Other than as referred to above, Kurt and Cindy did not speak to each other 
much during the divorce proceedings since the situation between them was tense and 
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antagonistic and communication between them was very distasteful and unpleasant. They 
would descend into argument when they talked. When they did talk in person or over the 
telephone or communicate by email it seemed to Cindy that Kurt's attention was focused on 
getting Zivile (later his wife) to Utah from New York and be able to stay here with a visa. 
Kurt talked to Cindy about getting Zivile's son to the United States who Kurt said Zivile had 
not seen in years. Other than the times referred to above, Kurt did not inquire about Cindy's 
health. Kurt never seemed to be concerned about Cindy's health. Kurt never asked who 
Cindy's doctor was. Kurt never asked for reports from the doctor. Kurt never asked for an 
update on Cindy's progress. Kurt never suggested that he was concerned with Cindy's 
health in any way or that Cindy's health made any difference to him. Kurt never discussed 
the severity of Cindy's condition nor the likelihood of recovery. Kurt never offered to help 
with the children, even when Cindy asked (begged) him to do so in the Fall of 2003 when 
Cindy was at her sickest. Kurt never sent a flower or brought a meal. One time Kurt did tell 
Cindy: "I hope you are sick. I hope you die then I won't have to pay you child support and 
Zivile will raise the kids." That conversation was in November 2003. R. 583-84, ^ [47. 
28. Although Cindy considered her sickness serious in the fall of 2003, Cindy 
never thought she was going to die. Cindy was really worried and concerned but never 
thought she was going to die. Cindy never told anybody that she was going to die. R. 583, 
!46;R.588,f59;R.591,169. 
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29. At no time did Cindy's legal counsel tell Kurt or Kurt's legal counsel that 
Cindy was dying. To the contrary, Cindy's legal counsel represented to Kurt's counsel that 
Cindy wanted to move to Texas, Cindy wanted to buy a house in Dallas, Texas and Cindy 
was ready to move on with her life. R.438, Tf32, R. 435, |24, 436, 1J30, 435, |24. 
30. Kurt and Cindy never had any discussions about Cindy's death (as Kurt 
alleges). Kurt and Cindy made no plans about an impending death (as Kurt alleges). Cindy 
never told Kurt in December 2003 (or at any other time) that Cindy had six months to live 
or that Cindy's life was being shortened for any reason (as Kurt alleges). Cindy never told 
Kurt that her cancer had spread to her liver and kidneys (as Kurt alleges). Cindy and Kurt 
never had any discussions about what to do with the children in case of Cindy's death (as 
Kurt alleges). Cindy never told Kurt that Cindy was going to die in six (6) months (as Kurt 
alleges). Interestingly, it took five (5) months from late December 2003 to get the Decree 
of Divorce agreed to and entered. R. 586, |52 and f55; R. 586-87, 1J56. 
31. Kurt's legal counsel never left any impression that Cindy's health or medical 
condition had any bearing on settlement. Kurt's legal counsel ever expressed concern, on 
Kurt's behalf or otherwise, about Cindy's health or medical condition or express any 
sympathy for Cindy's condition that would in any way indicate that Kurt considered Cindy's 
condition a factor in the settlement of the case. R. 431, fflj9-10, R. 433-34, lfl9, 436, |29, 
R. 438,1|33. 
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32. There was no time when Kurt requested from Cindy or her counsel further 
information regarding Cindy's health concerns. Kurt did not ask for medical records. Kurt 
did not subpoena medical information. Kurt did not ask that Cindy sign any waivers in 
connection with her medical records. Kurt did not ask for an independent medical 
examination. If Kurt came to the conclusion that Cindy was about to die he did so on his own 
and without any help from Cindy. R. 433, |18, 436, |30. 
3 3. Kurt, in contrast, made it abundantly clear that he had a medical condition that 
could result in a stroke. Kurt's health condition was so important to him that it was provided 
for in the Decree of Divorce yet there was no mention of Cindy's health and medical 
conditions in the Decree. R. 437-38, ^3 I. See also R. 561-63,1J6. A copy of the Decree of 
Divorce is attached hereto as Addendum "B." 
34. Kurt was anxious to have the divorce entered and concluded quickly so that he 
could marry another. R. 586, ^|54. 
35. In the end, all the settlement proposals and the Settlement Agreement and 
Decree of Divorce were drawn up by either Kurt or Kurt's attorney. R. 586, f 53. 
36. Kurt and Cindy were divorced on May 25,2004. Kurt remarried in May 2004 
— within a week after Kurt and Cindy divorced. Cindy remarried July 29, 2004, 60 days 
after Kurt and Cindy divorced. R. 578, ^35. 
37. Paragraphs 16, 17, 19, 20 - 34 of the Decree of Divorce provide: 
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16. Commencing May 1,2004, petitioner shall pay child support to 
respondent in the base amount of $4,500 per month until Margaret turns 18 or 
graduates from high school during the normal and expected year, whichever 
occurs later. Thereafter, petitioner shall pay child support to respondent in the 
base amount of $1,500 per month until William turns 18 or graduates from 
high school during the normal and expected year, whichever occurs later. 
17. The foregoing base child support amount exceeds the child 
support amount calculated pursuant to the guidelines set forth at Utah Code 
Ann. §78-45-7.2 through 78-45-7.21. 
23. Any increase or decrease in the parties' respective incomes shall 
not be grounds for modification of the foregoing child support obligations, 
either upward or downward, except that a decrease in petitioner's income due 
to verified disability and impairment shall be grounds for a downward 
modification. 
25. The marital residence, which is currently under contract for sale, 
shall be awarded to petitioner. Petitioner shall be entitled to reside in home as 
designated in the contract of sale and shall be entitled to proceeds from sale. 
26. The Snowbird timeshare shall be sold. The timeshare is currently 
under contract of sale and the parties shall cooperate to ensure that the sale is 
completed. Pursuant to the terms of the sale, the buyers shall bring the 
timeshare out of foreclosure and assume the loan obligation thereon. No 
proceeds are due or expected from the sale. 
27. Respondent shall be awarded stock in Silicon Optics, Inc. and 
S5 Wireless equal to one-half of petitioner's ownership interest in these 
companies as of April 28,2004.Petitioner's interest in Spectrum5 Racing shall 
be awarded to him, free and clear of any interest therein of respondent's. As 
of April 28, 2004, petitioner owns 615,000 shares of stock in S5 Wireless and 
50% of the stock in Silicon Optics, Inc. Petitioner shall provide stock 
certificates or equivalent documents to respondent on or before July 27,2004. 
28. Petitioner is hereby awarded all cash, retirement, and investment 
accounts titled in his name, including the Merrill Lynch 401(k) and the Wells 
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Fargo checking accounts. Respondent is hereby awarded all cash, retirement, 
and investment accounts titled in her name. 
29. The Lexus is hereby awarded to respondent. Respondent shall 
be solely responsible for the balance remaining on the Bank One loan secured 
by Lexus and shall ensure that the loan is paid in full on or before April 28, 
2004. 
30. The houseboat, airplane, jet skis, GTR, machine equipment, safe, 
guns, digital camera, and video camera are hereby awarded to petitioner. 
31. Respondent is hereby awarded all the jewelry she has acquired, 
her personal effects, and the following home furnishings: 
a. The entire dining area furniture; 
b. The tan armoire; 
c. The kids' curio cabinet; 
d. The two large mirrors; 
e. The secretary desk; and 
f. The paintings and framed photographs 
32. Petitioner is hereby awarded his personal effects and the 
remaining home furnishings not specifically awarded to respondent in 
paragraph 31 above. 
33. Petitioner shall make copies of the family videotapes and 
photographs and provide them to respondent. 
34. Petitioner shall pay respondent the sum of $50,000 forthwith 
upon execution of the settlement agreement. Of this amount, $25,000 shall 
come from the Wells Fargo account in his name. 
R. 561-63,1J6. A copy of the Decree of Divorce is attached hereto as Addendum "B." 
3 8. Cindy had no intention to defraud any person. When Cindy made the statement 
she did in the December 31, 2003 affidavit she had no intention to misstate any fact but she 
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read the affidavit, written by counsel, too quickly and inadvertently stated that the melanoma 
was a stage 3 and that it was her thyroid she had surgery on. What Cindy was trying to say 
was that she had been really ill and she had a melanoma and she was deeply concerned about 
its severity. Cindy did not make the statement knowingly believing it to be false or 
recklessly. R. 594, [^84. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The lower court erred in granting Kurt's Motion for Summary Judgment based upon 
the following: 
First: Summary Judgment Is Unavailable to Kurt Because Material 
Factual Disputes Exist. 
It is crucial to a motion for summary judgment that there be undisputed material facts. 
However, there were countless issues of fact that were disputed in this matter making the 
lower court's conclusions inappropriate and the granting of the Motion for Summary 
Judgment reversible error. 
Second: Fraud Claims Involve Determining State of Mind. State of Mind 
Determinations Are Best Left to Trial. 
State of mind, generally, cannot be determined on summary judgment. State of mind 
determinations are best left to the jury or the trial court sitting without a jury to determine 
after a trial on the matter. 
Third: Material Issues of Fact Exist on All of the Nine Elements of Fraud 
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That Kurt must Prove to Recover. Viewing All the Evidence and 
Factual Inferences in a Light Most Favorable to Cindy, a 
Reasonable Trier of Fact could Determine That Kurt Fails to Prove 
All, or Any One, of the Elements of a Claim for Fraud. 
There were countless factual matters before the court that would, taking them in alight 
most favorable to Cindy cause a reasonable trier of fact to conclude that Kurt had not been 
defrauded by Cindy. A claim for fraud has nine elements of fact that have to be proved in 
order to recover. Failure to prove any one of the nine elements of fact means that the 
complainant has failed to prove his case. There are facts in this matter presented by Cindy 
that makes each of the nine elements of fact disputed, leaving them subject to the 
determination of the facts by the trier of fact after the conducting of a trial where evidence 
is presented and credibility tested. 
Each of these reasons supporting the denial of Kurt's Motion for Summary Judgment 
and the reversal of the lower court will be discussed below. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1: SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN 
AWARDED TO KURT BECAUSE MATERIAL FACTUAL 
DISPUTES EXIST. THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD 
REVERSE THE LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT GRANTED 
THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMAND 
THIS MATTER FOR TRIAL. 
Utah law has defined the standard for granting a motion for summary judgment. The 
motion, to be granted, must be based upon undisputed facts. Utah R. Civ. Proc. 56. The 
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lower court is required to "liberally construe the facts and view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the party opposing the motion." Oberhansly v. Sprouse, 751 P.2d 1155, 1156 
(Utah Ct. App.1988); see also Dikeou v. Osborn, 881 P.2d 943, 945 (Utah App. 1994); 
Hamblin v. City of Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1990). After reviewing the facts 
in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, summary judgment must be denied if 
there is a dispute as to any material issue of fact. See Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 
P.2d 750, 752 (Utah App. 1988); see accord Atlas Corp. v. Clovis Nat'lBank, 731 P.2d 225, 
229 (Utah 1987); KO. v. Denison, 748 P.2d 588, 590 (Utah Ct. App.1988). Utah appellate 
courts have repeatedly held that "[i]t is inappropriate for courts to weigh disputed material 
facts in ruling on a summary judgment." Lucky Seven Rodeo Corp. v. Clark, 755 P.2d 750, 
752 (Utah App. 1988); see also Spor v. Crested Butte Silver Mining, Inc., 740 P.2d 1304, 
1308 (Utah 1987); W.M. Barnes Co. v. Sohio Natural Resources Co., 627 P.2d 56, 59 (Utah 
1981); Oberhansly, 751 P.2dat 1156. As the Utah Court of Appeals in Lucky Seven Rodeo 
explained: 
It matters not that the evidence on one side may appear to be 
strong or even compelling. One sworn statement under oath is 
all that is needed to dispute the averments on the other side of 
the controversy and create an issue of fact, precluding the entry 
of summary judgment. 
Lucky Seven Rodeo, 755 P.2d at 752 (emphasis added); see accord Holbrook Co. v. Adams, 
542 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1975). "[A]ll doubt as to the existence of a genuine issue of 
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material fact must be resolved against the party moving for summary judgment." Hay den v. 
First Nat Bank of Ml Pleasant, 595 F.2d 994, 996-997, (5th Cir. 1979). 
Furthermore, in considering a motion for summary judgment, the lower court is to 
"view the facts, including all inferences arising from those facts, in a light most favorable to 
the party opposing the motion and will allow the summary judgment to stand only if the 
movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the undisputed facts." Kilpatrick v. 
Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 1283, 1289 (Utah App. 1996); see also Republic Group, 
Inc. v. Won-door Corporation, 883 P.2d 285, 288-89 (Utah App. 1994).3 
Cindy was the non-moving party for the Motion for Summary Judgment below and 
she is entitled to have the facts, including all inferences from those facts, construed in her 
favor. Cindy has presented material and compelling facts that provide a complete defense 
to allegations of Kurt and, most importantly for the purposes of a motion for summary 
judgment, constitute disputed material facts. These facts implicitly conflict with the facts 
alleged by Kurt. While Kurt might not agree with and will undoubtedly will try to contest 
the factual assertions made by Cindy, that is the essence of a conflict in the testimony which 
3 
In fraud cases the burden is "upon the plaintiffs to prove the fraud charged by clear 
and convincing evidence." Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952). Failure to prove 
each element by "clear and convincing evidence" is fatal to a fraud claim. Each of the 
"elements must be proved with reasonable certainty by evidence, and that the absence of any 
one of such elements would be fatal to the plaintiffs case." Jones v. Pingree, 273 P. 303, 
305 (1928). If a single element of fraud is not proven then the alleged fraud did not occur. 
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precludes the granting of a motion for summary judgment. The ultimate determination as to 
the controlling facts must be left to the trier of the facts — either the trial court sitting 
without a jury or a jury—after the presentment of witnesses and evidence where credibility 
can be assessed on direct and cross examination and factual inferences can be made. 
POINT 2: FRAUD CLAIMS INVOLVE DETERMINING STATE OF MIND. 
STATE OF MIND DETERMINATIONS ARE BEST LEFT TO 
TRIAL WHERE THE TRIER OF FACT CAN DETERMINE THE 
STATE OF MIND AFTER HEARING ALL THE EVIDENCE. 
THEREFORE, THIS COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE 
LOWER COURT'S RULING THAT GRANTED THE MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND REMAND THIS MATTER 
FOR TRIAL. 
It has been long established that state of mind generally cannot be determined on 
summary judgment. "In cases which involve delving into the state of mind of a party, the 
granting of summary judgment is especially questionable." Norton v. The City of Marietta, 
432 F.3d 1145, 1154 (10th Cir. 2005); Seamons v. Snow, 206 F.3d 1021, 1028 (10th Cir. 
2000). The very issue is the credibility of the parties. "Such a credibility determination is 
appropriately made only by the fact finder: It is not the purpose of a motion for summary 
judgment... ." Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1103 (10th Cir. 2005). "Judgments about 
intent are best left for trial and are with the province of the jury" and are not to be left to 
summary judgment. Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1. 
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As will be discussed more specifically herein, Kurt's and Cindy's states of mind are 
in question in this case. At least five of the nine elements of fraud require a determination 
of state of mind 
POINT 3: KURT DOES NOT MEET THE ELEMENTS OF FRAUD SINCE, 
VIEWING ALL THE EVIDENCE AND FACTUAL 
INFERENCES IN A LIGHT MOST FAVORABLE TO CINDY, 
KURT FAILS TO PROVE ALL THE ELEMENTS OF A CLAIM 
FOR FRAUD. IN PARTICULAR THERE ARE CONTESTED 
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT ASSOCIATED WITH EACH 
ELEMENT OF KURT'S FRAUD CLAIM. THEREFORE, THIS 
COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE LOWER COURT'S RULING 
THAT GRANTED THE MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND REMAND THIS MATTER FOR TRIAL. 
The Utah Supreme Court has established that all the elements of fraud must be met 
to recover for fraud. The elements of a fraud claim are set forth in the 1952 opinion of Pace 
v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273 (Utah 1952), and are: 
(1) That a representation was made; 
(2) concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; 
(4) which the representor either (a) knew to be false, or (b) 
made recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such representation; 
(5) for the purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it; 
(6) that the other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of 
its falsity; 
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(7) did in fact rely upon it; 
(8) and was thereby induced to act; 
(9) to his injury and damage. 
Id. at 274-275. Each of the "elements must be proved with reasonable certainty by evidence, 
and that the absence of any one of such elements would be fatal to the plaintiffs case." 
Jones v. Pingree, 273 P. 303, 305 (1928). 
Kurt fails to establish, with undisputed facts, all the elements of fraud. A discussion 
of the facts and where they are disputed is set forth below in the order of the elements as 
reflected in the Pace v. Parrish, supra, decision. 
Inasmuch as there were disputed facts, Kurt's Motion for Summary Judgment the 
lower court should have been denied leaving the matter to the trier of fact to resolve after the 
presentment of witnesses and evidence where credibility can be assessed on direct and cross 
examination and factual inferences can be made. The trier of fact will be required to 
determine the contested issues of fact. The lower court, on a motion for summary judgment, 
seeing evidence only on paper, is not the trier of fact to determine the factual issues at this 
time. 
Each of the nine fraud elements will be discussed separately herein. 
ELEMENT 1: A representation must be made: 
There is evidence Cindy never said that she was about to die which is 
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what Kurt claims that he relied upon in negotiating the divorce 
settlement. 
For a defendant to be responsible for fraud that party has to have made a 
representation. That is the first of nine elements that must be proved. Sugar house Fin, Co. 
v. Anderson, 610 P. 2d 1369 (Utah 1980). 
Kurt bases his whole action on the premise that he acted in reliance that Cindy was 
going to die. Yet, Cindy never said that she was going to die. The "she is going to die" 
conclusion was, at best, an uneducated, untrained, non-physician, layman's, jump-to, leap-of-
faith, extrapolated, pessimistic, and speculative conclusion made by Kurt—not Cindy. Kurt 
had wished that Cindy would die and told her so but Cindy never shared that wish nor did 
she ever represent that she was going to die or was on the brink of death. It was Kurt who 
claims to have made the determination, without ever making inquiry of Cindy, Cindy's 
lawyer or Cindy's medical professionals or any other medical professionals, that Cindy was 
going to die.4 Statement of Facts Iflf 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32. 
Cindy never made any statement to Kurt that she was about to die. Yet Kurt claims 
that he made decisions on how he was going to settle the Divorce Action based upon Cindy 
being about to die. That was done at the same time that Cindy was saying otherwise. After 
4 
It is interesting that Kurt is disappointed that Cindy did not die and now sues Cindy 
for her failure to do so. If that is not a "damned if you do and damned if you don't" situation 
it is pretty hard to come up with any. 
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December 31, 2003, Cindy represented to Kurt that she was "doing a lot better," "doing 
fine," and "we have resolved most of the problems." Further, Cindy's lawyer told the Court 
in Kurt's presence and in the presence of Kurt's attorney that the "treatments have been 
successful." Even before this time Kurt's own sister reported to Kurt that Cindy did not 
appear to be concerned about her health. Statement of Facts fflf 23,26,27,28,29,30,31 and 
32. 
Based on Kurt's claims, and in spite of all that had been told him by Cindy, Cindy's 
lawyer and Kurt's own sister, and failing to seek any medically trained counsel, Kurt still 
comes (if we are to believe Kurt) to a conclusion when he signed the Settlement Agreement 
in late April 2004 that Cindy is about to die. 
Cindy never made the representation that Kurt claims to rely upon (that she was about 
to die). Kurt actually made up a representation (that Cindy was about to die) from what was 
said even thought Cindy had affirmed her good health several times prior to the Settlement 
Agreement being entered. Cindy cannot be responsible for Kurt hearing something that was 
never said. Statement of Facts fflf 23, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31 and 32. 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 1, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
ELEMENT 2: The representation must be concerning a presently existing 
material fact: 
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There is evidence that the representation made in December 2003 was not 
to a presently existing material fact of Cindy's condition in April and May 
2004. 
Kurt claims that a statement made on December 31, 2003 that Cindy had a stage 3 
melanoma and had surgery on her thyroid induced him to enter into the terms of the Decree 
of Divorce, where the terms of which were stipulated to on April 27, 2004 (some four (4) 
months after the December 31, 2003 statement) and entered by the Court on May 26, 2004 
(some five (5) months later).5 
The representation made on December 31,2003 was not a representation made of her 
health on April 27, 2004. In fact, by February 2004 Kurt was given updated health 
5 
Kurt made other claims in his Complaint that he (1) relied on a statement that Cindy would 
not remarry and that Cindy would not be able to have steady employment which he 
abandoned below, presumably because he realized that there is no legal support for claims 
based upon representations made to future speculative facts. The alleged misrepresentations 
Cindy made when she said she was "unable to maintain employment and that she had no intention 
of remarrying due to her illness"(&e |23. Complaint.) are not statements of material fact inasmuch 
as they are statements as to future conduct and as such are not representations as to a material fact 
nor expressions of intent as to abandon an existing right. Ravarino v Price, 260 P.2d 570, 573 (Utah 
1953). 
Cindy's two alleged statements are both contingent upon her remaining ill. Kurt makes no 
allegations that Cindy ever made statements regarding the likelihood of her healing or the estimated 
time it would take for her to heal. Both of Cindy's alleged statements seem to imply that upon 
healing she might be able to maintain employment and might reconsider her intention to remarry. 
Cindy's statements were not future promises of performance made in a contractual setting nor an 
abandonment of her right to work or remarry. The statements merely expressed Cindy's opinion with 
respect to employment and remarriage during her sickness and as such do not constitute a material 
fact. 
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information by Cindy herself. And, by April 27, 2004 Cindy and Kurt had numerous 
encounters (including an in-court proceeding where Kurt and Kurt's legal counsel were 
present) where Kurt was informed by Cindy or her legal counsel that she was doing well at 
that time. Those interactions were: 
• December 2003: Mediation sessions late December: No mention of 
Cindy's health ever came up. R. 577, f33, R. 577-78, 
1f34.6 
• 
• 
January 1, 2004: Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy was going to move to 
Dallas, Texas to live to be closer to Cindy's mother and 
father. 
January 8, 2004: Cindy told Kurt: "These children have suffered 
enough and I will be raising them on my own without 
you and it's hard and I will be doing this for the next 20 
years.55 R. 579-80, ffl[37 and 38. 
January 2004: Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy going to buy a home in 
Dallas. R. 578, f36. 
January 21, 2004: Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy was going to raise the 
children. R. 579-80, ^ 38. 
February 2004: Kurt tod Cindy: "It looks like you replaced me pretty 
fast. You must not be too sick if you are jetting off to 
6
 On December 23, 2003 Kurt and Cindy had mediation scheduled. That was 
Cindy's birthday. Cindy arrived with her lawyer. Cindy and her lawyer waited for Kurt 
to arrive. After about an hour Kurt was called who said that he was in California for 
vacation with Zivile, his girlfriend. Later that day Cindy called Kurt and asked why he 
would schedule a mediation for that day and not show up. Kurt responded saying again 
that he was in California on vacation with Zivile. Kurt, with sarcasm, also said: "Did you 
have fun in mediation on your birthday? How much did it cost you?55 R. 577-78, *|34. 
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Dallas every other weekend." 
Cindy told Kurt: "I'm doing a lot better. I'm doing 
fine. I think that we have resolved most of the problems 
[referring to her health]." 
R. 580-81,140. 
• January\ Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy was going to return to 
February 2004: work. 
• February 2004: Kurt told Cindy: Cindy would beg Kurt to take the 
children after working 12 hour shifts and attempting to 
raise three kids on her own. R. 585-86, ^51. 
• March 2004: Cindy's lawyer made this statement in open court 
with Kurt and Kurt's lawyer present: After referring 
to the melanoma went on to state that "these treatments 
[the melanoma treatments] are successful. R. 581-82, 
142, R. 436,1J28. 
• March 2004: Kurt told Cindy: "Gosh, I can't remember the last 
time you went to a concert." "It looks like you are 
having a lot of fun." 
Cindy told Kurt: "I'm having a great time. Life goes 
on." "I'm feeling great. I haven't felt this good in 
months." 
Kurt told Cindy: "I'm glad you are feeling better." 
R. 582,^43. 
• April2004: Kurt told Cindy: You are "looking really good." "So 
I guess you are okay." 
Cindy told Kurt: "Yeah, I'm feeling better and I'm 
moving on with my life and moving to Texas." Cindy 
said that she was considering marrying David. 
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Kurt told Cindy: You should marry someone "who 
was rich." 
R. 582-83,1J44 
• May 2004: Cindy told Kurt: That Cindy was probably going to 
marry David. 
When Cindy is telling Kurt that she is "doing fine" and "moving on" Kurt never (never, 
never, never) asks her: "But what about your cancer?" or "But what about your thyroid?" 
The statement of "fact" that Kurt says that he is relying upon never became part of any 
conversation with Cindy. The trier of fact will be able to conclude, based upon the 
circumstances and the interactions that there is a reason he never asks. A reasonable 
inference is that Cindy's health is the furthest thing from Kurt's mind. Statement of Facts 
fflf 26, 27, 28, 30and 32. 
The facts as they were represented to Kurt at the time of the signing of the Settlement 
Agreement were that Cindy was "doing fine," expressed in multiple ways and at multiple 
times. Statement of Facts [^26. The statements made on December 31,2003 do not represent 
a "presently existing material fact" for the signing of the Settlement Agreement on April 27, 
2004. Kurt wants to take a statement that was made four months earlier and superimpose it 
upon the facts that were in existence when the Settlement Agreement was actually signed and 
when the Decree of Divorce was entered months later and after any misstatement had been 
corrected on multiple times and in multiple circumstances. Statement of Facts f 26. 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 2, thereby 
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precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
ELEMENT 3: The representation must be false: 
There is evidence that the December 2003 representation, though 
technically inaccurate, was not false in its gist or sting. 
On December 31, 2003 Cindy, in an affidavit to the Court, represented that she had 
been ill. The affidavit provided that she had stage 3 melanoma and an operation on her 
thyroid. The "gist" or "sting" of what Cindy said in her affidavit was undoubtedly true even 
though the details were not entirely accurate. It was like saying that one is wearing a blue 
shirt when the shirt in fact lavender. The essence is that one is wearing a shirt. Cindy clearly 
understood that she had a melanoma. Cindy also had kidney problems. Cindy had very real 
and serious symptoms that caused her significant distress and concern. Cindy knew that she 
was ill. Cindy was incapacitated by her health condition for many months in the latter half 
of 2003. Cindy was even frightened by her health condition and because of the collision of 
all her health concerns into a very devastating 3-4 month block she was certainly considering 
that she had significant health concerns. Cindy expressed her situation in a way that reflected 
what she thought she was experiencing and what she had been told by medical professionals 
she had — a melanoma and at the same time serious other painful and uncomfortable 
conditions that could reflect greater problems. When she read the affidavit prior to signing 
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Cindy did not catch that the statement referred to her thyroid instead of her kidneys. Clearly, 
however, that is a distinction without a difference and is evidence that on New Years Eve 
2003 that Cindy did not carefully read the affidavit prepared by her lawyer. Cindy had several 
surgical procedures with her kidneys and three surgeries with the melanoma, all of which 
suggest that the error in her statement was neither knowingly false or reckless. Statement of 
Facts fflf 9-21 and 25. 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 3, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
ELEMENT 4: The representor must either (a) know the representation to 
be false, or (b) made the representation recklessly, knowing 
that he had insufficient knowledge upon which to base such 
representation. 
There is evidence that Cindy did not know the representation to be false 
and did not make the statement recklessly, knowing that she had 
insufficient knowledge upon which to base such a representation. 
r 1 
I NOTE: This element requires the determination of Cindy's state of I 
1
 mind that is inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment. See ' 
. Point 2 above. . 
I I 
Even if the December 31, 2003 statement is the operative statement that Kurt relied 
upon and that statement is inaccurate the gist or sting of that statement was accurate to the 
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extent that Cindy knew it. Cindy is not a physician and cannot be expected to use medical 
terms completely accurately. (Neither can Kurt justifiably rely upon Cindy's representation 
as will be discussed infra). Clearly, all Cindy knew was what she had been told by doctors 
and that she had been very sick for a several month period with multiple symptoms. During 
this time she experienced pain through her back area, nausea and vomiting, urinating blood, 
hair falling out, abnormal menstrual cycles, excessive weight loss, anxiety and depression.7 
Cindy read the December 31,2003 affidavit quickly and ended up misspeaking that she had 
undergone operations on her thyroid when she should have said kidneys where she 
underwent at least three procedures. Cindy thought that she was extraordinarily ill and indeed 
she was.8 She had been diagnosed by a physician9 that she had a melanoma, a potentially 
danger skin cancer. Statement of Facts ^f 9-21 and 25. 
7
 R. 322; 325; 331; 569, |13; 573-74, ^22; 694, | 6 : From June 2003 to 
December 2003, Cindy had extensive medical problems surrounding the time of her 
excision including extensive back pain, nausea and vomiting, urinating blood, hair falling 
out, abnormal menstrual cycles, excessive weight loss, and anxiety and depression. These 
medical problems resulted in Cindy being emotionally fragile and believing that her 
melanoma was very serious. 
8
 R. 576, TJ30: Cindy made at least thirty-eight doctors visits from August 
2003 to May 2004. 
9
 R. 323; 387; 570-71, [^16: Dr. R. Dirke Noyes ("Dr. Noyes"), an 
oncologist, wrote on an excused absence form to the trial court that Cindy was "having a 
wide excision of melanoma." 
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Kurt wants to hold Cindy to the precision of a doctor yet come to his own conclusion 
(in his non-doctor layman's conclusion) that Cindy was dying. All Cindy intended to convey 
was that she was ill (which she was) and that her illness had been significant (which it was). 
But Cindy did not catastrophize her condition. Kurt wants to hold Cindy to the precision of 
a doctor yet come to his own conclusion (in his non-doctor layman's conclusion) that Cindy 
was dying. All Cindy intended to convey was that she was ill (which she was) and that her 
illness had been significant (which it had). Cindy did not intend to convey that she was dying 
and did not say she was dying. Cindy made no implication that she was dying. Statement of 
Facts ffi[23, 26, 275 28, 29 and 30. 
Further, taken in the context of other statements made later (some within 10 days of 
the signing of the Affidavit and within at most only a few days from the receipt of the 
Affidavit by Kurt) that she was "doing a lot better," "doing fine," and "we have resolved 
most of the problems" how could one say that at the time of the entry of the Settlement 
Agreement and ultimately the Decree of Divorce (five months after the original statement) 
that Cindy had knowingly or recklessly misrepresented the facts. Prior to the signing of the 
Settlement Agreement of April 27, 2004 Cindy had clearly and straightforwardly told Kurt 
that she was "doing fine." How many times and in how many ways does Kurt have to hear 
that Cindy was "doing fine" before he believes it? Instead, Kurt wants the court to believe 
that he can rely on a statement made in December 2003 instead of the statements made by 
37 
Cindy after that date reflecting her then current state of health. Statement of Facts ^ 26 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 4, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
ELEMENT 5: The representation must be for the purpose of inducing the 
other party to act upon it. 
There is evidence that Cindy did not make the representation for the 
purpose of inducing the other party to act upon it. 
NOTE: This element requires the determination of Cindy's state of 
mind that is inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment. See 
Point 2 above. 
I 
The statement made by Cindy was in the context of a temporary order where Cindy 
asserts that she was unable to work and, therefore, should not have income ascribed to her 
for the purpose of temporary child support and temporary alimony. Apart from whether 
Cindy had a stage 3 melanoma or not Cindy had been extremely ill and represented that she 
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was ill to the Court. Given Cindy's then recent past medical history of bed rest and pain 
(including kidney pain) her conclusion was that she would not be able to work, at least in the 
short term. While Kurt claims that Cindy made later representations about bad ongoing 
health Cindy clearly and unequivocally denies that she did. Furthermore it is interesting that 
Kurt sets forth no claim that in any conversation she and Kurt had that Cindy's health was 
ever used a leverage for a child support term that is "remarriage proof." Kurt does not report 
(because there is nothing to report) that Cindy said or even suggested to him that he should 
enter the "remarriage proof Settlement Agreement because he will not have to abide by it 
for long because she was about to die. Even if she did make such a suggestion Kurt had 
every power to refuse to accept it. 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 5, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
ELEMENT 6: The other party receiving the representation, must act 
reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity. 
Kurt did not act reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity. 
r 1 
I NOTE: This element requires the determination of Kurt's state of I 
1
 mind that is inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment. See ' 
. Point 2 above. . 
I I 
The 10th Circuit Court of Appeals in analyzing the Utah fraud standard 
explained that "in the context of a negligent misrepresentation action,.. . the plaintiff has 
a duty to act reasonably to protect its own interests." Fullmer v. Wohlfeiler & Beck, 905 F.2d 
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1394, 1397 (10th Cir. 1990). The nature of litigation and negotiations is intrinsically 
adversarial and as such places parties at arms length to deal with one another. Parties in such 
adversarial contexts cannot justifiably rely on the statements of the adverse party. As 
expressed in the Florida court's opinion in Smith v. Hollingsworth, 96 So. 394: 
There can be no ground for complaint against representations 
where the hearer lacked the right to rely thereon, because he had 
reason to doubt the truth of the representation, as where the 
transaction was entered into upon the express understanding of 
both parties that a material fact might exist of which one of them 
was ignorant, or where a party has expressly said that he would 
not be bound by his representations, or was obviously hostile to 
the hearer and interested in misleading him. 
(Emphasis added.) 12 Ruling Case Law, 352; 26 Corpus Juris, 1141, 1142; Smith v. 
Hollingsworth, 85 Fla. 431, 96 So. 394. That element of hostility that should place a party 
on notice (as recognized by the Florida opinion) precludes a party claiming that he justifiedly 
relied on the statement without at least making some independent inquiry. That higher 
degree of skepticism required of litigants is recognized as follows: 
Where fraud is asserted as a basis for vacating or setting aside 
a judgment or decree, it must appear that the judgment or decree 
was in fact procured by fraud. Moreover, the complaining party 
normally must be able to show that he or she was free from fault, 
neglect, or inattention and that he or she relied on the wrongful 
conduct to his or her injury. 
24 Am. Jur. 2d Divorce and Separation § 434 (Emphasis Added). 
In a Utah case {Cheever v. Schramm, 577 P.2d 951, 954 (Utah 1978)) the Utah 
Supreme Court outlines guidelines for determining if reliance is reasonable The lower court 
held the reliance unreasonable. In affirming, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
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In determining whether one claiming fraud has reasonably relied 
upon a misrepresentation, factors such as respective age, 
intelligence, experience, mental condition, and knowledge of 
each party should be considered, along with their relationship, 
their access to information, and the materiality of the 
representations, 
(Emphasis added.) See also, Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 273, 274-75 (1952); 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977). Consequently, the knowledge of 
the parties, their relationship (divorcing spouses) and the materiality of the misrepresentation 
need to be taken into account to determine if the aggrieved party acted with reasonable 
diligence. 
The Utah Court of Appeals dealt with this issue of reasonable reliance in the case of 
Maackv. Resource Design & Const., Inc., 875 P.2d 570 (Utah 1994). The court in Maack, 
relied heavily on the opinion of the court in Klas v. Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992), which based its decision of failing to find fraud, because the aggrieved party's 
"conduct did not rise to the level of ordinary diligence." Id. at 141. The court further held, 
persuaded by the reasoning in Sokolosky v. Tulsa Orthopaedic, Inc. Pension Trust, 566 P.2d 
429 (Okla. 1977), that fraud may not be predicated on alleged false statements the truth 
"which could have been ascertained with reasonable diligence by the party asserting their 
falsity." Sokolosky v. Tulsa Orthopaedic, Inc. Pension Trust, 566 P.2d429,431 (Okla. 1977) 
{quoting Onstott v. Osborne, 417 P.2d 291, 293 (Okla. 1966)). 
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff has a duty to make an 
investigation and inquiry in to the representation according to the dictates of reasonable care. 
Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P.2d 1060, 1068 (Utah 1996). The court stated: 
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While the question of reasonable reliance is usually a matter 
within the province of the jury, there are instances where courts 
may conclude as a matter of law, there was no reasonable 
reliance. 
Id at 1067. 
The Gold Standard, supra, opinion further went on to explain that even if a false 
statement is found to have been made, when there are subsequent communications which 
would correct the misrepresentation then reliance is unreasonable as a matter of law. Id. at 
1067-68; see also Mikkelson v. Quail Valley Realty, 641 P.2d 124, 126 (Utah 1982). The 
Gold Standard court even further held that "[a] party cannot rely upon oral statements by the 
opposing party in light of contrary . . . information. 915 P.2d at 1068. 
Kurt could not justifiably rely on the statements he claims he relied upon. 
First: It was not reasonable for Kurt to extrapolate from Cindy's statement 
made in December 31,2003 that she was going to die imminently. See 
discussion with regard to Element 1 above. 
Second: It was not reasonable for Kurt to rely on a statement on December 31, 
2003 when there was ample communication between Kurt and Cindy 
that the "treatments are successful," that Cindy was "doing a lot better," 
"doing fine," and "we have resolved most of the problems." See 
discussion with regard to Element 4 above. 
Third: Kurt and Cindy were in litigation and were adverse, extremely 
contentious and untrusting. Kurt had the full power of the Court to 
determine such a large conclusion that Cindy was about to die. See 
discussion immediately below. 
Cindy and Kurt were adversaries in a divorce proceeding and a particularly hostile 
divorce action at that. In such an environment it is essential that Kurt exercise reasonable 
diligence to discover the truth as to statements affecting his interests. If Kurt intended to rely 
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on a belief that Cindy was about to die (a representation that she never made) you would 
expect that Kurt show some diligence to ascertain that to be the fact apart from his own 
uneducated medical conclusions. It seems reasonable that the bigger the factor in a very 
contentious, adversarial setting, the more scepticism one should have in the veracity of the 
statement. Further, any conclusion that Cindy is about to die is clearly speculative of a 
prospective event and subject to change as the person obtains medical care and attention. 
Cindy could actually get better. 
Given Kurt's claim that he relied on the statement he inexplicably remains silent and 
fails to do anything to confirm it at a time that he had all the tools to find out information. 
Kurt had the greatest of all litigation powers — the subpoena power — and other discovery 
tools to obtain documents and testimony from doctors or others who at the least have the 
education, training and experience upon which an opinion of Cindy's life or death could be 
made. But what does Kurt do? Nothing}. What does he say to Cindy? Nothing! He does 
not even make any inquiry of Cindy of her treatments and the prognoses of her living or 
dying. Kurt simply—without the foundation of education, training and experience — leaps 
to the conclusion that Cindy is about to shortly die and fails to make any inquiry to determine 
the reasonableness of his conclusion. He sought no doctors' opinions or in any way crossed 
any threshold of reasonable inquiry. Statement of Facts Y|J 30-33. 
Was Kurt's reliance reasonable? No it was not. Nonetheless, reasonableness is a jury 
issue and not one to be decided on a motion for summary judgment. It is the jury that needs 
to determine the reasonableness of a party's actions. See e.g. Maack, 875 P.2d 570 at 577 
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(See Price-Orem, 713 P.2d 55, 59 (Utah 1986)). 
Kurt does not claim that Cindy prevented him from making his case during the divorce 
proceedings. Kurt could not reasonably rely on Cindy's statements made during litigation 
because of the hostile nature of the proceedings, his failure to exercise due diligence or to 
take reasonable steps to discover the truth or untruth. Further, the claimed misrepresentation 
could change at any time — such as Cindy living. Furthermore, Cindy had continually 
confirmed and reconfirmed her health state as "doing a lot better," "doing fine," and "we 
have resolved most of the problems." 
Litigation by its nature is adversarial and in divorce proceedings can become very 
emotionally charged and especially adversarial. Perhaps there is no field of law where 
emotions are so charged and volatile. Divorce actions create a hostile environment where 
one's interests are at stake to be lost. This is the kind of hostile situation which the Florida 
court in Hollingsworth, supra, refers to which precludes the allegedly deceived party from 
relying on the representations of the other party. Furthermore, in order for Kurt to be free 
from "fault, neglect, or inattention" he could have exercised the standard and easily used 
tools of discovery available during litigation. He was represented by counsel, had the 
subpoena power, and plenty of opportunities to use it to verify Cindy's statements that he 
claimed he relied upon. Use of any of these methods would have verified the truth or 
uncovered the untruth. Kurt's reliance on Cindy's statements amidst a hostile environment 
of litigation and failing to be free from "fault, neglect, or inattention" makes his reliance 
unjustifiable. Maack, 875 P.2d 570 at 577. Statement of Facts ffl[4. 
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Further, it is reasonable that on the evidence that will be presented that a jury could 
conclude that the statement Kurt claims induced him to act is merely a pretext for Kurt to 
avoid the agreement that he had previously made to pay child support. Kurt looks for a nail 
to hang his buyer's remorse hat. 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 6, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
ELEMENT 7: The plaintiff must have in fact relied upon the representation. 
There is evidence that Kurt did not in fact rely upon the representation. 
r 1 
I NOTE: This element requires the determination of Kurt's state of ' 
1
 mind that is inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment. See ' 
. Point 2 above. . 
I I 
As noted above, Kurt has made other claims in his Complaint that he relied on a 
statement that Cindy would not remarry and that Cindy would not be able to have steady 
employment which he now abandons. There are further and other reasons for Kurt's actions 
that the trier of fact will be required to determine. Based upon the facts of this matter, taken 
in a light most favorable to Cindy, the jury could infer that Kurt acted not in response to any 
representation of Cindy' but because: (1) Kurt thought Cindy would never remarry, (2) Kurt 
wanted to marry his girlfriend who was in the United States from overseas (Kurt married her 
within a week of divorcing Cindy) or (3) Kurt wanted to avoid sharing a large financial 
windfall from a "multi million dollar . . . investment55 where Kurt's income and bonuses 
1 
would increase from his then $200,000.00\year level that was just months away and which 
he had concealed from Cindy. The windfall never materialized but the prospect for huge 
financial gain surely is a motivating factor to get the divorce closed and over. Either way, 
there are plenty of other reasons that may be the motivating factor for Kurt's decision to 
settle as he did that have no relation to the claimed misrepresentations. Statement of Facts 
ffi[8 and 36. 
In addition, how could Kurt rely on the statement when he had been fully advised that 
Cindy was doing well over and over again and even acknowledged that Cindy was doing 
better.10 See discussion for Element 2 above. 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 7, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
ELEMENT 8: The representation must have induced the aggrieved party 
to act. 
There is evidence that Kurt was not induced to act by the representation. 
r , 
I NOTE: This element requires the determination of Kurt's state of I 
1
 mind that is inappropriate on a motion for summary judgment. See 
. Point 2 above. . 
I I 
10
 R. 5 82, TJ43: In late March 2004 or early April 2004, Cindy told Kurt 
described her condition as follows: "I'm having a great time. Life goes on . . . I'm 
feeling great. I haven't felt this good in months." To which Kurt responded, "I'm glad 
you are feeling better." 
2 
There as never any indication that Cindy's heath condition was ever on Kurt's mind. 
To the contrary, the evidence is that sufficient for the trier of fact to conclude that Cindy's 
health condition was the furthest thing from Kurt's mind. Cindy's health was never a topic 
of conversation between Cindy and Kurt other than Cindy telling Kurt that she is "doing a 
lot better," "doing fine," and "we have resolved most of the problems." See discussion for 
Element 2 above. Kurt never made an effort to challenge Cindy's representation regarding 
her health nor did Kurt's lawyer ever inquire of Cindy' s health. It was quite frankly a non-
issue in the case. Throughout the months there was no indication from anyone on Kurt's side 
that he was relying on the health condition expressed in the December 31,2003 affidavit and 
certainly no evidence that Kurt expressed any belief to anyone on Cindy's side that Kurt 
thought Cindy was on the eve of death. Interesting, when the Decree was entered it had been 
five months since Kurt had concluded that Cindy was going to be dead in six months, yet 
Cindy was looking better (so much better that even Kurt commented on her appearance) and 
acting more energetic. See Statement of Facts Tflj 23 and 26-32. 
It is also interesting that at the time the final documents for settlement were agreed 
upon there was discussion as to Kurt's medical condition and that was accounted for but 
there was no discussion as to Cindy's medical condition. If Cindy's medical condition was 
such a major motivating factor for Kurt it should have been reflected in the paragraph setting 
forth child support. Yet the discussion was all about Kurt and his health. That would have 
been the most likely time for Kurt to raise Cindy's health but he did not. Statement of Facts 
133. 
47 
Cindy was on her way to be married again, to move to Dallas, to raise the children and 
to start a new life — and Kurt knew it. Kurt was also on his way to be married and start a 
new life with his girlfriend. Kurt, knowing that Cindy was going to be married soon, should 
have encouraged him to move the child support in an opposite direction by designating some 
of it as alimony. There is a good and supportable reason for that — Kurt did not want further 
inquiry into the assets and this was a method of transferring assets. The jury will have the 
opportunity to determine whether that "extra" child support was in fact a tool to even the 
property distribution that was so heavily weighted in favor of Kurt. Statement of Facts fflf 
7. 
There is a strong inference that Kurt is using the December 31, 2003 affidavit as a 
pretext to disavow the Decree of Divorce. 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 8, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
ELEMENT 9: There must be an injury and damage. 
There is Evidence that Kurt suffered no injury and damage. 
The ninth element of fraud described in Parrish, supra, requires that the moving party 
have suffered "injury or damage." "The measure of damages for fraud is the difference 
between the value of property received and the value it would have had if the representations 
were true." Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981) (citing Pace v. Parrish, 247 P.2d 
273 (Utah 1952)). Kurt suffered no damages from reliance on the alleged misrepresentations 
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since the property distribution of the divorce decree heavily favored Kurt with respect to the 
value of assets known and included several assets which values were unknown. Further there 
were certain psyche rewards to stopping the litigation and going on with one's life. 
Even if Kurt was fraudulently induced into entering the Settlement Agreement Kurt 
suffered no damage as a result of reliance on the statements and without damages there can 
be no fraud. Jones v. Pingree, 273 P. 303, 305 (1928). Kurt wants this court to isolate the 
child support from the rest of the Decree of Divorce in an attempt to show that Kurt is 
paying far more than what he would have been required if the child support guideline was 
followed. Yet the Decree has to be viewed as a whole since it was settled as a whole. The 
allocation of assets in the divorce decree heavily favored Kurt. During the divorce 
proceedings, Cindy made many concessions of assets to Kurt because of his desire to retain 
certain property (i.e. race car, Porsche automobile) of high value. As a result of the 
disproportionate share of assets in Kurt's favor. Kurt conceded to the reallocation of assets 
that would otherwise be due to Cindy on divorce though the payment of enhanced child 
support. The arrangement resulted in a distribution of assets agreed upon by both parties. 
The method chosen by the parties allowed the closure of the case without valuing all the 
assets since valuing assets that Kurt had hidden would have been extraordinarily costly, time 
consuming and difficult. The method chosen made the distribution remarriage proof 
(prevented termination for remarriage) and bankruptcy proof (Kurt could not discharge his 
obligation to Cindy by seeking bankruptcy protection). That is a perfectly logical and 
legitimate method of assuring that Cindy would get from the 15 year marriage what she was 
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otherwise entitled to obtain. Statement of Facts fflf 7. 
The child support guidelines are just that — guidelines — and child support awards 
can exceed the guideline amounts. Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.12. Since at the time of 
divorce Kurt was by his own admission making $200,000.00\year base (or 
$16,666,66\month) and the guideline table only goes to $10,100.00\month (or 
$ 1215200.00\year) Kurt's income exceeded the table by $78,800.00 or 65%. Utah Code Ann. 
§78-45-7.14. Paying $4,500.00\month in child support on an income of $16,666.66\month 
does not seem outrageous and unjustifiable. Further, by Kurt's own admission Kurt was 
expecting an increase in his salary and bonuses and wealth that would have softened the 
award. Kurt was clear in his demand that the child support would not be increased. 
In divorces everything is linked to everything else. That is not a jury issue. Property 
distribution, alimony, debt allocation, child support and related issues are all issues are 
reserved exclusively for the Court acting in its equitable powers in the divorce action. 
At the least, there is a conflict in the testimony regarding Element 9, thereby 
precluding the granting of summary judgment. Consequently, this Court should reverse the 
lower court and remand this matter to the lower court for a trial on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
Kurt's Motion for Summary Judgment should have been denied by the lower court. 
Taken in a light most favorable to Cindy, there are plenty of disputed material facts. 
Summary judgment is not appropriate when there are contested issues of material facts. It 
is abundantly clear that substantial and material facts are contested. As such, we respectfully 
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suggest that the lower court's granting of the Motion for Summary Judgment be reversed and 
the matter be sent back to the Third District Court for trial. 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Order from which appeal is taken) 
-;OpV StfvjTTO'-'•'•• 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM KURT DOBSON, : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 050922651 
(Consolidated Case No. 034904073) 
V S . : 
CINDY DELAUGHTER COOPER, : 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on May 10, 2007, in 
connection with the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment. At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under advisement to 
further consider the parties' written submissions, the relevant legal 
authority and counsels7 oral argument. Being now fully informed, the 
Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
This case stems from a divorce action involving the Plaintiff and 
Defendant. On May 25, 2004, Judge Henriod entered a Divorce Decree which 
was premised on the parties' Settlement Agreement. In this action, the 
Plaintiff contends that the Defendant, his ex-wife, defrauded him in the 
divorce action in order to obtain a more favorable settlement agreement. 
After considering the parties' respective legal arguments, the Court 
determines that the Plaintiff has established the elements of fraud, as 
a matter of law, and is therefore entitled to summary judgment. 
DOBSON V COOPFR PAGE 2 MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Specifically, the undisputed material facts establish that m the divorce 
action, the Defendant repeatedly misrepresented her medical condition, 
including indicating that she had been diagnosed with advanced stages of 
cancer The undisputed evidence is that the Defendant had never been 
diagnosed with any type of cancer The Court concludes that the 
Defendant perpetuated the misrepresentations concerning her medical 
condition for tne purpose of inducing the Plaintiff to reach a favorable 
settlement with her Accordingly, the Court grants the Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
After taking this matter under advisement, the undersigned Judge 
discovered that he is also presiding over the parties' divorce case (Case 
No 034904073) Given that the Court has jurisdiction over both cases 
and m light of the overlapping factual and legal issues presented m 
both the divorce case and the present civil case, the Court determines 
that consolidation of both cases is appropriate under Rule 42 of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure Furtner, the protocol at Third District Court 
is to consolidate later-filed cases into previously filed cases. 
Therefore, the present case is consolidated into Case No 034904073. 
Next, m granting of the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, 
it should be clear that the Court rules that he was fraudulently induced 
into entering into the parties' settlement agreement m the divorce 
action Accordingly, the settlement agreement is invalid and therefore 
set aside Further, the Divorce Decree which is premised on the invalid 
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settlement agreement is vacated. The divorce action is to proceed in the 
typical manner and the Court will consider any damages stemming from the 
civil case in the context of the overall property division. It should 
be noted that such damages, if any, will be offset by any advantages that 
the Plaintiff has received since the entry of the Divorce Decree by the 
parties' agreed upon property settlement that may have actually 
benefitted him. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court, 
granting the Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, consolidating the 
divorce and civil action, setting aside the parties' settlement 
agreement, vacating the Divorce Decree and directing the parties to 
proceed with their now-consolidated divorce action in the typical manner. 
Dated this day of June, 2007. 
ROBERT P. FAUST 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this day of June, 
2007 
Peter Stirba 
Sarah E Spencer 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
215 S State Street, Suite 
P 0 Box 810 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
D Miles Holman 
Attorney for Defendant 
9533 South 700 East, Suite 100 
Sandy, Utah 84070 
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ADDENDUM "B" 
DECREE OF DIVORCE 
PAIGE BIGELOW (6493) 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM KURT DOBSON, ] 
Petitioner, ] 
vs. 
CINDY DELAUGHTER DOBSON, 
Respondent. ] 
) DECREE OF DIVORCE 
) Civil No. 034904073 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
) Commissioner Susan Bradford 
The above-entitled matter came before the court pursuant to petitioner's motion for entry 
of default decree of divorce. The court reviewed the motion, the affidavit of petitioner in support 
of the motion, the parties' written Agreement, and the previously entered findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Based thereon, and for good cause appearing, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED: 
COPY SENT TO CLIENT 
11 174- 222£— 
INITIALS 
Dissolution of Marriage 
1. Petitioner William Kurt Dobson is hereby awarded a decree of divorce from 
respondent Cindy Delaughter Dobson on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Said decree 
shall be final upon signing and entry. 
Legal Custody 
2. The parties are the parents of three minor children born during their marriage, 
namely, Margaret Lela Dobson, age 10, born March 3, 1994, Kristen Elizabeth Dobson, age 9, 
born April 20, 1995, and William Cortland Dobson, age 4, born November 4, 1999. 
3. The parties are hereby awarded joint legal custody of their minor children. The 
parties shall work together to support one another's relationships with their minor children. 
4. The parties shall refrain from criticizing, demeaning, or derogating the other party 
to or in the presence of the children. The parties shall prohibit any such conduct or speech from 
occurring in the children's presence. 
5. The parties shall advise and consult with one another before making major 
decisions concerning the children's religious training, education, medical care, mental health 
care, and extra-curricular activities. 
6. The parties shall exchange information with one another concerning the health, 
education, general welfare, and significant functions in which the children are participating in a 
timely fashion. 
2 
7. The parties shall each be entitled to make day-to-day and emergency medical 
decisions for the children when the children are in their care. 
8. The parties shall each immediately notify the other in the event of a medical 
emergency involving the children. 
9. The parties shall each be entitled to direct access to all school, medical, and other 
records pertaining to the children. 
10. The parties shall each provide the other with their current address and telephone 
number within 24 hours of any change. 
Primary Residence 
11. Respondent's residence, which is or will be within the Dallas, Texas area, shall be 
designated as the children's primary residence. 
12. The parties shall work together to ensure that the children have frequent and 
continuing contact with petitioner. 
13. At a minimum, petitioner shall be entitled to the following parent-time with the 
children in Salt Lake City, or wherever he may be located. 
a. Summer school vacations beginning one week following the last day of 
the school year and ending one week prior to the first day of the next 
school year. 
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b. The Christmas break and Spring break in even-numbered years, beginning 
the day following the day school lets out and ending the day before school 
begins again. 
c. The Thanksgiving break in odd-numbered years, beginning the day 
following the day school lets out and ending the day before school begins 
again. 
14. Petitioner shall be entitled to parent-time with the children in Dallas, Texas, or 
wherever they may be located, upon 10 days' notice to respondent. Petitioner shall ensure that 
the children do not miss school during these visits and that their homework is completed. 
15. Petitioner shall be solely responsible for the costs of transportation for all parent-
time with the children, except for the parent-time set forth in 13.b. and 13.c. above, for which 
respondent shall be solely responsible. 
Child Support 
16. Commencing May 1, 2004, petitioner shall pay child support to respondent in the 
base amount of $4,500 per month until Margaret turns 18 or graduates from high school during 
the normal and expected year, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, petitioner shall pay child 
support to respondent in the base amount of $3,000 per month until Kristen turns 18 or graduates 
from high school during the normal and expected year, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, 
petitioner shall pay child support to respondent in the base amount of $1,500 per month until 
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William turns 18 or graduates from high school during the normal and expected year, whichever 
occurs later. 
17. The foregoing base child support amount exceeds the child support amount 
calculated pursuant to the guidelines set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.2 through 78-45-
7.21. 
18 The parties shall cooperate with one another to establish an account wherein the 
foregoing base child support sums shall be automatically deposited one- halfonthe5 thand one-
half on the 20th day of each month. 
19 Petitioner shall pay an additional sum of $ 1,000 to respondent on or before 
December 5 of each year through the year in which Margaret graduates from high school, 
$666.00 through the year in which Kirsten graduates from high school, and $333.00 through the 
year in which William graduates from high school. The intent of this is to provide funds for 
Christmas gifts to the children. 
20. Petitioner shall be solely responsible for the children's orthodontia and dental 
expenses. 
21. Petitioner shall establish a college fund for the children and contribute $200 per 
month to it, commencing May 1, 2004. The children shall be the sole and exclusive beneficiaries 
of said fund, and petitioner shall not access it for purposes other than the children's higher 
education expenses except upon respondent's express written approval. Said funds shall be 
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applied to the children's higher education expenses in equal amounts or as agreed by the parties 
in writing. Petitioner shall provide yearly statements to respondent. 
22. Respondent shall be solely responsible for all expenses related to the children, 
including medical insurance and uninsured medical expenses, except those expenses specifically 
allocated to petitioner as set forth above. 
23 Any increase or decrease in the parties' respective incomes shall not be grounds 
for modification of the foregoing child support obligations, either upward or downward, except 
that a decrease in petitioner's income due to verified disability and impairment shall be grounds 
for a downward modification. 
Tax Exemptions 
24. Petitioner shall be entitled to claim the dependency exemptions for the minor 
children. 
Property Division 
25. The marital residence, which is currently under contract for sale, shall be awarded 
to petitioner. Petitioner shall be entitled to reside in the home as designated in the contract of 
sale and shall be entitled to the proceeds from the sale. 
26. The Snowbird timeshare shall be sold. The timeshare is currently under a contract 
of sale and the parties shall cooperate to ensure that the sale is completed. Pursuant to the terms 
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of the sale, the buyers shall bring the timeshare out of foreclosure and assume the loan obligation 
thereon. No proceeds are due or expected from the sale. 
27. Respondent shall be awarded stock in Silicon Optics, Inc. and S5 Wireless equal 
to one-half of petitioner's ownership interest in these companies as of April 28, 2004. 
Petitioner's interest in Spectrum5 Racing shall be awarded to him, free and clear of any interest 
therein of respondent's. As of April 28, 2004, petitioner owns 615,000 shares of stock in S5 
Wireless and 50% of the stock of Silicon Optics, Inc. Petitioner shall provide stock certificates 
or equivalent documents to respondent on or before July 27, 2004. 
28. Petitioner is hereby awarded all cash, retirement, and investment accounts titled in 
his name, including the Merrill Lynch 401(k) and the Wells Fargo checking accounts. 
Respondent is hereby awarded all cash, retirement and investment accounts titled in her name. 
29. The Lexus is hereby awarded to respondent. Respondent shall be solely 
responsible for the balance remaining on the Bank One loan secured by the Lexus and shall 
ensure that the loan is paid in full on or before April 28, 2004. 
30. The houseboat, airplane, jet skis, GTR, machine equipment, safe, guns, digital 
camera and video camera are hereby awarded to petitioner. 
31. Respondent is hereby awarded all the jewelry she has acquired, her personal 
effects, and the following home furnishings: 
a. The entire dining area furniture; 
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b. The tan armoire; 
c. The kids' curio cabinet; 
d. The two large mirrors; 
e. The secretary desk; and 
f. The paintings and framed photographs. 
32. Petitioner is hereby awarded his personal effects and the remaining home 
furnishings not specifically awarded to respondent in paragraph 31 above. 
33. Petitioner shall make copies of the family videotapes and photographs and 
provide them to respondent. 
Cash Award 
34. Petitioner shall pay to respondent the sum of $50,000 forthwith upon execution of 
the settlement agreement. Of this amount, $25,000 shall come from the Wells Fargo account in 
his name. 
Debt Allocation 
35. Petitioner shall be responsible to pay or assume the following debts: 
Citifmancial, Chase, HFC, Chevron, and Nordstrom. 
36. Respondent shall be solely and separately responsible for the Capitol One, 
Mervyns, and Limited Too debts and any unpaid medical bills incurred for her or the children. 
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37. The parties are unaware of any debts existing in either parties' name, except as set 
forth herein. In the event a debt is hereafter discovered, the party incurring the debt shall be 
solely and separately responsible for paying it and shall hold harmless and indemnify the other 
party thereon. Neither party shall incur debt in the other parties' name, nor be responsible for 
any debt incurred by the other party, from April 28, 2004 onward. The parties shall ensure that 
all joint accounts are closed forthwith upon the signing of the settlement agreement. 
Alimony 
38. Neither party is awarded alimony from the other. 
Income Taxes 
39. The parties shall file joint tax returns for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003. 
Petitioner shall be solely responsible for all tax liability owing in these years. The parties shall 
file separately in 2004 and thereafter. 
Attorney Fees 
40. The parties shall each be solely and separately responsible for their own attorney 
fees incurred in connection with this matter, except that petitioner shall pay $7,500 to respondent 
for attorney fees she has incurred forthwith upon the sale of the marital home. 
Full Disclosure 
41. In the event it is determined that assets or liabilities of the parties have not been 
distributed or allocated herein, for whatever reason, including the failure of either party to 
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disclose those assets or liabilities, then the distribution and allocation of those undisclosed or 
unallocated assets and liabilities may be addressed by either party pursuant to a petition to 
modify the decree of divorce, and the nonmoving party shall not claim or assert that distribution 
or allocation of the undisclosed asset or liability must be pursued by an independent action. If 
such a petition is brought, the moving party's standard of proof shall be preponderance of the 
evidence and shall not be limited to the establishment or proof of fraud by the other party 
DATED this dav of 2004. 
BV THE COURT: 
STEPHEN L. HENRIOD 
District Court Judge 
APPROVED: 
D. MILES HOLMAN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this _jj day of May, 2004,1 caused a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE to be mailed by United States mail, postage prepaid, to 
the following 
D Miles Holman 
HOLM AN & WALKER, LC 
9537 South 700 East 
Sandv, UT 84070 
11 
ADDENDUM "C" 
STATEMENT 
FROM 
DR. R. DIRKE NOYES 
03/18/2002 01 12 8015718 
FROM DESfGN-n-BUND 
Oct -22 -03 02 - 4-OP 
CINDYDOBSO 
PHONE NO 801 685 0811 
PAGE 61 
Oct 22 2003 03 STPn ^ 
R. Dirk ^ e s , M D 
324 Tench Avenue, #249 
Salt Lake Oty, (JT 84103 
(801) 408 3S55 
EXCUSED ABSENCE 
Patent ijj^j)^ _ &ok$<r^ 
Has been urxfer my care for the period 
From 
_Aj£ff Q3> 
T o _ J $ ^ £ ^ r r i ^ 
I confirm hts 8bs«nce was physician advised 
Slgnatu 
Special Instructions4 
^ 
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ADDENDUM "D 
STATEMENT 
FROM 
DR. GEORGE W. MIDDLETON 
M : DESIGN-f i-BLIND P H O N F NO - p e n m ^ Q Q I 1 r, 
KHUNb NO. . 801 S8b 0 8 1 1 O c t . 22 2 0 0 3 0 6 : i 9 P M P 2 
MIDDLETON UROLOQICAL ASSOCIATES 
lOiOIA-CT HSCTSOCTTH 
3AtT IAXB CfTY, tnxw m o a 
1 0 - 2 3 - 0 3 
To whom it may concern, 
Cindy Dobson is a patient of mine, 
on the 24th of October w© are doing 
surgery to rsraove her kidney stonee. 
Uhis patient has stones obstructing 
both kidneys and vilL r.std another 
surgery at another time in the next 
tvo to four vaaks. If you nave any 
other questions please call me office. 
Thank you, 
G e o r g e W, M i d d l e t o n , MD 
Cooper doc ID 19 
03/18 /2002 01 :12 
1U/^1/^UD3 08 :52 
801571b J 
8015718506 
O 
< 
CINDVDOBSO 
CINDYDOBSO 
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ADDENDUM "E" 
DETAILED LISTING OF PROPERTY DISTRBUTION 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
(h) 
(i) 
G) 
(k) 
(1) 
(m) 
(n) 
(o) 
(P) 
(q) 
ITEM OF PROPERTY 
Marital Home, Pepperwood, Sandy, Utah 
Spectrum 5 Racing 
Vi Stock in S5 Wireless 
Vi Silicon Optics, Inc. Stock 
All retirement benefits 
Merrill Lynch 40 l(k) 
Wells Fargo Checking accounts 
Houseboat 
Airplane 
Jet skiis 
GTR Race car 
Machine Equipment (for GTR Race Car) 
Safe 
Guns 
Digital Camera5 
Video Camera 
Remaining Home Furnishings 
Equity 
$65,250.00 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Unknown 
Unknown 
(he did not 
allow access 
to the 
accounts) 
$40,000.00 
$40,000.00 
$10,000.00 
$250,000.00 
$100,000.00 
$8,000.00 
$5,000.00 
$2,000.00 
$2,000.00 
$66,000.00 
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Both the Digital Camera and the Video Camera were top-of-the line models that Kurt 
purchased. Kurt always purchased such items during the marriage. 
(r) All Cash 
Additional Items Kurt Received Not in Decree of 
Divorce 
(s) Porsche 
(t) Trailer 
$64,000.00 
(Along with 
another 
$100,000 -
$200,000) 
$80,000.00 
$25,000.00 
KNOWN TOTAL: $757,250.00 
To Cindy 
(a) 
(b) 
(c) 
(d) 
(e) 
(f) 
(g) 
ITEM OF PROPERTY 
Lexus Automobile 
:on Optics, Inc. Stock ( Cindy never 
received this stock) 
Vi S5 Wireless stock 
Jewelry 
Dining Room Area Furniture 
Tan Armoire 
Kids' Curio Cabinet 
Equity 
$10,000.00 
Never 
received from 
Kurt 
$06 
$29,000.00 
$2,000.00 
$2,000.00 
$2,000.00 
At the time of divorce, Cindy was told the stock's future price would be worth about 
$500,000.00. However, when Kurt left the company in December 2004, Dave and Kurt both told 
Cindy that Kurt published a damaging paper about the company that he sent to capital investors, who 
subsequently withdrew their investments. Kurt did not deliver the stock to Cindy until after he left 
company and the stock is currently worthless. Dave has told Cindy that the company is attempting 
to gain new investors. He said that in time, the stock may regain its value, but Cindy have no 
assurance that it will. If Kurt had given the stock to Cindy immediately following the divorce, Cindy 
would have been able to sell it for at least some value. 
(h) Two Large Mirrors $ 1
 ?000.00 
(i) Secretary Desk $2,000.00 
(j) Paintings and Framed Photographs $5,000.00 
(k) Cash Payment (in consideration for stock in $50,000.00 
Spectrum 5 Racing) 
Additional Items Cindy Received Not in Decree 
of Divorce 
(1) BMW ( Cindy had to sell the BMW to live off of $17,000.00 
during the divorce proceedings) 
(m) Repayment from Loan to Odyssey Dance $28,000.00 
Company (this money was used to pay medical 
bills, and attorneys fees and for living expenses 
for the year) 
TOTAL: $148,000.00 
R. 565-68,T|ll. 
ADDENDUM "F" 
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
PAIGE BIGELOW (6493) 
KRUSE LANDA MAYCOCK & RICKS, LLC 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Eighth Floor, Bank One Tower 
50 West Broadway 
P.O. Box 45561 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0561 
Telephone: (801)531-7090 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILLIAM KURT DOBSON. ) 
Petitioner, ) 
vs. 
CINDY DELAUGHTER DOBSON, ; 
Respondent. ] 
) SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
) Civil No. 034904073 
Judge Stephen L. Henriod 
) Commissioner Susan Bradford 
Petitioner William Kurt Dobson and respondent Cindy Delaughter Dobson, hereby 
stipulate and agree as follows: 
Jurisdiction & Grounds 
1. Petitioner is an actual and bona fide resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
and has been for at least three months immediately preceding the commencement of this action. 
2. Petitioner and respondent are husband and wife, having been married on the 29th 
day of April, 1989, in Jackson County, State of Mississippi. 
FILE COPY 
3. Irreconcilable differences have developed between the parties, making 
continuation of their marriage impossible. The parties have been living separate and apart since 
June 2003. The parties agree that each is entitled to a decree of divorce from the other on 
grounds of irreconcilable differences of the marriage. 
Purpose 
4. Petitioner has filed a petition for decree of divorce and respondent has filed a 
counter-petition for decree of divorce, both of which are currently pending before the court. The 
parties by this agreement intend to fully resolve all issues incident to said petitions and to the 
dissolution of their marriage. The parties understand and acknowledge that this agreement, upon 
execution, will be binding on them, and further, that the terms of this agreement will be 
incorporated into a decree of divorce dissolving the bonds of matrimony that presently exist 
between them. 
Consent to Default 
5. Respondent hereby acknowledges receipt of a copy of the summons and petition 
for decree of divorce filed herein July 3, 2003, consents that her default may be entered herein, 
and agrees that a decree of divorce incorporating the terms of this agreement may be entered by 
the court upon petitioner's affidavit of jurisdiction and grounds without further notice to her. 
Legal Custody 
6. The parties are the parents of three minor children born during their marriage, 
namely, Margaret Lela Dobson, age 10, born March 3, 1994, Kristen Elizabeth Dobson, age 9, 
born April 20, 1995, and William Cortland Dobson, age 4, born November 4, 1999. 
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7. The parties stipulate that they each are fit and proper persons to be awarded the 
care and custody of minor children and that they each have loving and valuable relationships 
with their children, which they should work together to support. The parties agree that they 
should be awarded joint legal custody of their children. 
8. The parties agree to refrain from criticizing, demeaning, or derogating the other 
party to or in the presence of the children and to prohibit any such conduct or speech from 
occurring in the children's presence. 
9. The parties agree to advise and consult with one another before making major 
decisions concerning the children's religious training, education, medical care, mental health 
care, and extra-curricular activities. 
10. The parties agree to exchange information with one another concerning the health, 
education, general welfare, and significant functions in which the children are participating in a 
timely fashion. 
11. The parties agree that they will each be entitled to make day-to-day and 
emergency medical decisions for the children when the children are in their care. 
12. The parties agree that they will each immediately notify the other in the event of a 
medical emergency involving the children. 
13. The parties agree that they will each be entitled to direct access to all school, 
medical, and other records pertaining to the children. 
14. The parties agree that they will each provide the other with their current address 
and telephone number within 24 hours of any change. 
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Primary Residence 
15. The parties agree that respondent's residence will be designated as the children's 
primary residence. Respondent is currently in the process of relocating with the children to the 
Dallas, Texas area where she will be establishing a residence for herself and the children. 
16. The parties agree to work together to ensure that the children have frequent and 
continuing contact with petitioner. 
17. The parties agree that, at a minimum, petitioner will be entitled to the following 
parent-time with the children in Salt Lake City, or wherever he may be located. 
a. Summer school vacations beginning one week following the last day of 
the school year and ending one week prior to the first day of the next school year. 
b. The Christmas break and Spring break in even-numbered years, beginning 
the day following the day school lets out and ending the day before school begins again. 
c. The Thanksgiving break in odd-numbered years, beginning the day 
following the day school lets out and ending the day before school begins again. 
18. The parties agree that petitioner will be entitled to parent-time with the children in 
Dallas, Texas, or wherever they may be located, upon 10 days' notice to respondent. Petitioner 
will ensure that the children do not miss school during these visits and that their homework is 
completed. 
19. The parties agree that petitioner will be solely responsible for the costs of 
transportation for all parent-time with the children, except for the parent-time set forth in 17.b. 
and 17.c. above, for which respondent will be solely responsible. 
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Child Support 
20. Commencing the first day of the month following the month in which this 
agreement is signed, the parties agree that petitioner will pay child support to respondent in the 
base amount of $4,500 per month until Margaret turns 18 or graduates from high school during 
the normal and expected year, whichever occurs later. Thereafter, the parties agree that 
petitioner will pay child support to respondent in the base amount of $3,000 per month until 
Kristen turns 18 or graduates from high school during the normal and expected year, whichever 
occurs later. Thereafter, the parties agree that petitioner will pay child support to respondent in 
the base amount of $1,500 per month until William turns 18 or graduates from high school 
during the normal and expected year, whichever occurs later. 
21. The parties acknowledge that the foregoing base child support amount exceeds 
the child support amount calculated pursuant to the guidelines set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 78-
45-7.2 through 78-45-7.21. 
22. The parties agree to cooperate with one another to establish an account wherein 
the foregoing base child support sums will be automatically deposited one-half on the 5th and 
one-half on the 20th day of each month. 
23. The parties agree that petitioner will pay an additional sum of $1,000 to 
respondent on or before December 5 of each year tlirough the year in which Margaret graduates 
from high school, $666.00 through the year in which Kirsten graduates from high school, and 
$333.00 through the year in which William graduates from high school. The intent of this is to 
provide funds for Christmas gifts to the children. 
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24 The paities agree that petitioner will be solely responsible foi the children's 
orthodontia and dental expenses 
25 The parties agree that petitioner will establish a college fund for the children and 
contribute $200 per month to it, commencing the month following the month in which this 
agreement is signed The children will be the sole and exclusive beneficianes of said fund, and 
petitioner will not access it for purposes other than the children's higher education expenses 
except upon respondent s express written approval Said funds will be applied to the childien's 
higher education expenses in equal amounts or as agieed by the paities in writing Petitionei will 
piovide veaih statements to lespondent 
26 I he parties agree that respondent will be solely responsible for all expenses 
related to the children including medical insurance and uninsured medical expenses, except 
those expenses specifically allocated to petitioner as set forth above 
27 The parties agiee that the any increase or decrease m the parties' respective 
incomes will not be grounds for modification of the foregoing child support obligations, eithei 
upward or downward, except that a decrease in respondent's income due to verified disability & 
impairment will be grounds for a downward modification 
Tax Exemptions 
28 The parties agree that petitioner will be entitled to claim the dependency 
exemptions for the minor children 
6 
Property Division 
29. The parties agree that the marital residence, which is currently under contract for 
sale, should be awarded to petitioner. Petitioner will be entitled to reside in the home as 
designated in the contract of sale and will be entitled to the proceeds from the sale. 
30. The parties agree that the Snowbird timeshare should be sold. The parties 
acknowledge that the timeshare is currently under a contract of sale and agree to cooperate to 
ensure that the sale is completed. Pursuant to the terms of the sale, the buyers will bring the 
timeshare out of foreclosure and assume the loan obligation thereon. No proceeds are due or 
expected from the sale. 
31. The parties agree that respondent should be awarded stock in Silicon Optics, Inc. 
and S5 Wireless equal to one-half of petitioner's ownership interest in these companies as of the 
date this agreement is signed. The parties agree that petitioner's interest in Spectrum5 Racing 
should be awarded to him, free and clear of any interest therein of respondent's. As of the date 
of this document, Petitioner owns 615,000 shares of stock in S5 Wireless, and 50% of the stock 
of SiliconOptics, Inc., and will provide stock certificates or equivalent documents to Respondent 
within 90 days of the execution of this agreement. 
32. The parties agree that petitioner should be awarded all cash, retirement, and 
investment accounts titled in his name, including the Merrill Lynch 401(k) and the Wells Fargo 
checking accounts, and respondent should be awarded all cash, retirement and investment 
accounts titled in her name. 
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33. The parties agree that the Lexus should be awarded to respondent. Respondent 
will be solely responsible for the balance remaining on the Bank One loan secured by the Lexus 
and will ensure that the loan is paid in full on or before the date this agreement is signed. 
34. The parties agree that the houseboat, airplane, jet skis, GTR, machine equipment, 
safe, guns, digital camera and video camera should be awarded to petitioner. 
35. The parties agree that respondent should be awarded all the jewelry she has 
acquired, her personal effects, and the following home furnishings: 
a. The entire dining area furniture; 
b. The tan armoire; 
c. The kids' curio cabinet; 
d. The two large mirrors; 
e. The secretary desk; and 
f. The paintings and framed photographs. 
36. The parties agree that petitioner should be awarded his personal effects and the 
remaining home furnishings not specifically awarded to respondent as set forth above. 
37. The parties agree that petitioner will make copies of the family videotapes and 
photographs and provide them to respondent. 
Cash Award 
38. The parties agree that petitioner should pay to respondent the sum of $50,000 
forthwith upon execution of this agreement. Of this amount, $25,000 will come from the Wells 
Fargo account in his name. 
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Debt Allocation 
39. The parties agree that petitioner will be responsible to pay or assume the 
following debts: Citifinancial, Chase, HFC, Chevron, and Nordstrom. 
40. The parties agree that respondent will be solely and separately responsible for the 
Capitol One, Mervyns, and Limited Too debts and any unpaid medical bills incurred for her or 
the children. 
41. The parties are unaware of any debts existing in either parties' name, except as set 
forth herein. In the event a debt is hereafter discovered, the party incurring the debt will be 
solely and separately responsible for paying it and will hold harmless and indemnify the other 
party thereon. Neither party will incur debt in the other parties' name, nor be responsible for any 
debt incurred by the other party, from the date this agreement is signed. The parties will ensure 
that all joint accounts are closed forthwith upon the signing of this agreement. 
Alimony 
42. Respondent, by signing this agreement, waives any claim she may have to 
alimony, either now or in the future. Respondent specifically acknowledges and agrees that her 
waiver cannot be overcome by any change in circumstance, foreseen or unforeseen, and that the 
terms of this agreement were negotiated in express consideration of this irrevocable waiver. 
Income Taxes 
43. The parties agree that they will file joint tax returns for the years 2001, 2002, and 
2003. Petitioner will be solely responsible for all tax liability owing in these years. The parties 
will file separately in 2004 and thereafter. 
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Attorney Fees 
44. The parties agree that they will each be solely and separately responsible for their 
own attorney fees incurred in connection with this matter, except that petitioner will pay $7,500 
to respondent for attorney fees she has incurred forthwith upon the sale of the marital home. 
Full Disclosure 
45. The parties acknowledge that they have fully disclosed all material facts regarding 
assets and liabilities of the parties or the marriage. If it is later determined that assets or 
liabilities have not been allocated between the parties expressly in this agreement and the decree 
contemplated herein, for whatever reason, including the failure of either party to disclose those 
assets or liabilities then, in that event, the distribution and allocation of those undisclosed or 
unallocated assets and liabilities may be addressed by either party pursuant to a Petition to 
Modify the Decree of Divorce. Both parties expressly waive any claim, right or assertion that 
the distribution and allocation of non-disclosed or unallocated assets must be pursued by an 
independent action. In the event of a Petition to Modify, contemplated herein, the moving 
party's standard of proof shall be a preponderance of evidence and shall not be limited to the 
establishment or proof of fraud by the other party. 
DATED this ? ^ t U day of f\ffi^ , 2004. 
; ^ ^ r * s / ^ ^ ^ 
KURT DOBSON 
Petitioner 
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me by KURT DOBSON this fr^^ay of 
JBpal .2004-
;
 * • * -«« _MC : 
ySSSp^ Notary Public "1 
$3M^% AMBER BANKS . 
J t S l o J 215 South State Street Suite 550 I 
I V * V < K S 9 / I / ^ L ^ C t t y , Utah 84111 , 
I ^ 3 ^ ^ ^ M P v £ / My Commission ExpifBs I 
I ^ZZ^JS ^ July 19.2006 
L- m^Z^Lm
 m
 S t a t
°
 0f
 ^^h J 
APPROVED 
ffiyw^ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
r ^"N *• 
PAIGE BIGELOW 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DATED thi s zs day of , 2004. 
DY DOBSON 
Responder 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me by CINDY DOBSON this ^ day of 
MpuL , 2004. 
APPROVED \m 
FRANKS EVANT 
NOTARY wtuc*$rto*n 
1975 E SOft 
SANDY. UT. 
COMM.EXP \U ' ' i i^«ipOTABXPU^LIC ^ 
MILES D. HOLMAN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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